The Spread of Liberal Democracy led to a more Peaceful World

Introduction & Overview

This critical essay focuses upon the impact of the spread of global democracy on international peace.

War and conflict between nations, as well as unrest within countries, appear to be constants in an otherwise ever-changing world (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997). The last two centuries have witnessed the spread of liberal democracy from its birthplace in France to North America and, in recent decades across Asia, some pockets of South America and Africa and most of Europe (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997). This spread of democracy notwithstanding, contemporary times appears to be as affected by war and conflict as previous ones (Raknerud & Hegre, 1997). Whilst Europe has been spared from the repetition of tremendous and devastating conflict for nearly 70 years, opinion is divided on whether such peace has come about because of democracy or the availability of nuclear weapons with sparring countries (Ray, 1995). Wars and conflict have otherwise occurred in South America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and South Asia, sometimes between two democratic states and sometimes between others (Ray, 1995).

It has been put forward by several experts on international relations that the absence of war between democratic states is practically an empirical law (Owen, 1994). It has been argued that a wide range of diverse historical, political and economic factors work against the possibility of war between liberal democracies (Owen, 1994). The spread of liberal democracies across the world should thus lead to international peace (Owen, 1994).

This study engages in the examination of this contention through the examination of the democratic peace theory, as well as its criticism by experts who argue that the global spread of democracy could reduce the chances of international peace on account of the basic process of democratisation itself. This study analyses the relationship between democratic spread and international peace and attempts to arrive at an informed conclusion.

Discussion and Analysis

The prevailing realist account of international relations argues that peace between nations essentially depends upon the balance of power and common strategic interests, which combine together to make war and its consequences too difficult and illogical to warrant consideration (Lai & Slater, 2006). The democratic peace proposition however opposes the validity of this line of thought, positing that the structural and normative elements of the democratic peace theory provide a more substantial reason for the lower prospects of war between democracies (Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001).

Structural Theory

The structural element of the democratic peace theory is based upon the assumption that the formation of the institutions of democratic and representative governments, which contain officials and decision-makers who are elected and accountable to large population segments, make war an undesirable and unattractive alternative for the governments and citizens of democratic countries (Hensel et al., 2000). With the risks and costs of war likely to impact large segments of voting populations, it was likely that the electorate would remove incumbent leaders or parties for the initiation and continuation of economically and socially disadvantageous wars (Lai & Slater, 2006). This would result in a clear and institutional disincentive for democratic leaders to engage in war without understanding the thoughts and emotions of the electorate on the issue (Hensel et al., 2000). Whilst it is not necessary for all voters or elected leaders to be liberal in their approaches towards war and conflict, the very presence of democratic structures, which provide leverage to citizens to influence government decisions, should reduce the likelihood of democratic leaders engaging in wars with other liberal democracies (Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001). Such political and electoral compulsions are likely to even influence leaders who do not subscribe to liberal thought from engaging in initiatives for going to war (Leblang & Chan, 2003). The very presence of political pluralism, competitive electoral processes and free speech will inhibit the tendencies of illiberal leaders to go to war (Leblang & Chan, 2003).

Normative Theory

The normative / cultural view of the democratic peace theory approaches the issue from a dyadic, rather than monadic perspective, stating that the sharing of liberal and democratic values by democratic states will minimise the tendencies for war between them and ensure the continuance of peace (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002). Advocates of the normative perspective state that liberal and democratic political cultures focus upon the enhancement of the economic and social life of citizens and encourage the resolution of conflicts through peaceful discussion and negotiation (Mousseau et al., 2003). The inherent democratic political process of a country is thus extended beyond borders and envelopes other democratic states because the leaders of all such states essentially agree to the validity and strengths of the democratic process in the resolution of contentious issues that can lead to inter-state conflict and the possibility of war (Reiter & Stam, 2002).

The democratic political ideology plays a key role in the ways in which democracies differentiate between allies and adversaries (Russett & Oneal, 2001). The leaders of democracies are likely to regard other democracies, which give appropriate regard and respect to the interests of their citizens, with trust and consideration, whereas other states, which engage in violence and oppression against their people are likely to be perceived with suspicion and mistrust (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002). The US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reinforce the theory of democracies partnering each other to go to war against non-democratic states (Russett, 2009). The likelihood of the existence of such perceptions implies that the possibility of war between two nations will not diminish in a concrete manner until and unless such perceptions exist between them (Reiter & Stam, 2003). The war of 1812 between the USA and UK has been explained by the American perception of Britain as a monarchy rather than a democracy (Reiter & Stam, 2003).

Whilst several experts have tended to separate the institutional and normative elements of the democratic peace theory, modern experts on war and international relations are attempting to combine these perspectives to develop a comprehensive democratic peace theory (Mousseau et al., 2003). The chances of peace and the absence of war between two democratic nations are thus heightened by both internal democratic compulsions as well as the perspectives of nations about each other (Oneal & Russett, 2001).

Criticism of Democratic Peace Theory

The democratic peace theory has however been subjected to significant criticism by scholars who have put forward opposing arguments to explain the apparent empirical justification of the democratic peace theory (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). Political realists have argued that the reduction of chances of war and conflict between democratic nations stems primarily from common interests rather than similar political structures (Oneal & Russett, 2001). Such experts point out that congruence of economic interests between democracies results in their alignment with each other and against other non-democratic states with which they do not share strategic interests (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). The realist argument has, however been contradicted in substantial measure by studies that have revealed that democratic political systems, rather than alliances between democracies play important roles in the prevention of war and conflict (Mousseau, 2002).

Critics of the democratic peace theory, however, appear to be correct to some extent when they state that liberal democracies may not be less likely to engage in conflict with non-democratic nations (Choi, 2003). Available empirical evidence contradicts the monadic or singular proposition that liberal democracies will have lesser tendencies to engage in force or armed conflict, irrespective of the political structure of the opposing state (Choi, 2003). This may however be on account of the fact that democratic states continue to function in a fragmented world, peopled by liberal democracies and authoritarian and state-controlled political regimes (Kinsella, 2005). With the majority of democratic states having to exist in environments of power politics, they are compelled to keep the option of war in their assortment of alternative courses of action in their dealings with other states (Kinsella, 2005). Research has however revealed that democracies, in such circumstances, are more likely to engage in low level conflicts rather than full scale wars (Mousseau, 2005). The increase of liberal democracies across the world should in such circumstances result in the possibility of full scale wars reducing to low level conflicts (Mousseau, 2005).

The dyadic proposition of the democratic peace theory rests upon the relationships between two members of a dyad of countries and the potential of conflict between them (Russett, 2009). It has been seen that if such a dyad, comprising of an autocratic and a democratic state, undergoes a transformation, wherein the autocratic state is replaced with a democratic nation, the chances of war between the two members of dyad reduce by practically one third (Jervis, 2002). Research has also revealed that the extremely low likelihood of interstate rivalries between democratic dyads reduces the propensity for war significantly over time (Jervis, 2002). This would imply that coalitions of democratic states would be able to generate a broad environment of peace and mutual cooperation because democratic systems would make it difficult for leaders to autonomously reverse or contradict mutual commitments (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002). The continuance of democratic systems would, in relationships between nations, increase accountability and commitment to various pacts and agreements (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002).

Such predictability in policy and action was not however likely to be present in non-democracies, where the unpredictability in decision making and lack of openness of political systems was likely to make accountability and commitment to previous agreements difficult (Russett & Oneal, 2001). It has been seen that such lack of transparency and openness can also reduce the chances of non-democratic states to win wars (Russett, 2009). Such a finding suggests that democracies would work to strengthen their alliances, not only because of ideological or normative causes, but also for the achievement of gains in military efficiencies (Russett & Oneal, 2001). It has also been seen that the possibility of conflict between two democracies has not increased in recent decades, despite significant increases in the number of democratic dyads in the international space (Oneal & Russett, 2001). Such a finding implies the likelihood of reduction of conflict in the world order pursuant to the growth of democracies and democracy dyads (Oneal & Russett, 2001).

The Impact of Democratisation on Peace

Several experts have however argued that the very process of bringing about democracy can reduce the chances for international peace (Russett, 2005). Research studies have revealed that democratic transitions are more likely to take place when national political systems become particularly weak, or when vested interests and elitist groups within nations are threatened by democratisation processes (Russett, 2005). Such circumstances can result in the development of extremely aggressive national sentiments, as well as the development of internal strife and civil war or interstate conflict. The weakness of political institutions during the initial stages of democratic transition, combined with increasing demands from the masses for participation in decision making can incentivise elitist ruling structures to adopt diverse populist, ethnic and religious policies before they are held accountable to the people (Reiter & Stam, 2003).

Such internal and inter-state conflicts have arisen several times in Europe, Africa and Asia and have been particularly visible in the Yugoslav wars (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). The era of Slobodan Milosevic, which lasted from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s witnessed several conflicts, involving Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). These were specifically concerned with the transition of nations from state control to democracy (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). Researchers and historians have observed in this context that several incidents of internecine strife and civil conflict have arisen in the course of the last century because of the failure of mixed or transitional political regimes, which are less able than democracies or authoritarian states in containing mass movements through democratic or repressive methods (Reiter & Stam, 2002).

The successful and stage-wise transition from an authoritarian structure to a democracy through an appropriate sequence, like for example (1) the development of national awareness, (2) the growth of the involvement of people in politics and elections and finally (3) the institutionalisation of democratically established governments can significantly reduce the chances of such strife (Reiter & Stam, 2002). The study of conflicts associated with the transition of countries from authoritarian regimes to democracies revealed that most nations were unable to achieve democratic structures in accordance with such stage-wise processes (Leblang & Chan, 2003). The absence of such order sometimes resulted in intervention by neighbouring states, when they were convinced about the existence of democratic forces in neighbour countries and were provided with international approval, tacit and explicit, to intervene in the affairs of otherwise sovereign nations (Gelpi & Griesdorf, 2001). Such efforts at bringing in democracy can on occasion result in the subversion of the democratic process itself and in reversal to authoritarian and political totalitarianism (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005).

Conclusions and Recommendations

This short paper aimed to analyse the relationship between the spread of democracy and international peace.

The examination of various information sources, especially research studies and books on various aspects of the subject, revealed that democracies were significantly less inclined than authoritarian or state-run political regimes to engage in war (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). The monadic element of the democratic peace theory posited that the leaders of democratic countries were subjected to various electoral and governance associated constraints in going to war until and unless there were really good social and economic reasons to do so (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). Any efforts by the leaders of democratic governments to engage in wars that could have significantly adverse economic and social consequences for citizens were bound to be resisted strongly by voting populations and result in the removal of leaders espousing war (Mousseau, 2005). Such pressures would in all likelihood eliminate wars altogether or substantially reduce their scope and intensity (Russett, 2009).

The dyadic element to the democratic peace theory argued that the elected governments of two liberal democracies would be likely to be more comfortable with conflict resolution through discussion and negotiation, rather than through military action (Reiter & Stam, 2003). The transitioning of authoritarian and mixed regimes to democracy over a long time period would in such circumstances reduce the possibility of war on a broad scale (Reiter & Stam, 2003). Several researchers have however pointed out that the positive impact of democratisation upon global peace notwithstanding, the very process of democratisation from authoritarian or transiting regimes to democratic ones could result in significant levels of mass unrest, the use of repressive force and civil war (Russett, 2009). It was necessary for democratisation to occur in a structured and stage-wise process to eliminate the possibilities of such disturbances (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005).

The conduct of the study revealed that notwithstanding the potential of the democratisation processes to cause civil unrest and even inter-state war, the spread of liberal democracies was likely to reduce the chances of war between nations on account of both monadic and dyadic causes (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). The likelihood of war in such circumstances would go down significantly even for non-democratic states on account of their knowledge of the probability of democratic states entering into military alliances (Mansfield & Snyder, 2005). It can thus be concluded that the spread of liberal democracy across the world should certainly result in the development of a more peaceful international order.

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