How Would You Win a War?

Introduction & Overview

This essay attempts to engage in the examination of various approaches to winning a war and to come to appropriate conclusions on the issue.

The conduct of warfare has from historical times been considered to be one of the most uncertain and risky of activities with largely unpredictable outcomes (Van Avery, 2007). Alexander, for instance, conquered much of the known world in a short period of time but could not motivate his soldiers to cross the Jhelum in India and decided to return despondent (Van Avery, 2007). Both Napoleon and Hitler were defeated by the cold Russian winter, whilst the mighty US Military had to retreat from Vietnam, harried from harassed and fatigued by young and motivated guerrillas (Bradford, 2000). These same people and organisations are otherwise known and have been acclaimed for their military prowess and famous victories in War (Oliver, 2008).

An examination of extant research and writing revealed that whilst uniform principles and methods of fighting and winning wars are yet to be acknowledged and agreed upon, individual nations and armies have developed and formulated their own strategies over time with the help of diverse, unique inputs (McKercher & Hennessy, 1996). With so much of ambiguity, lack of clarity and agreement existing on the issue of warfare and the best ways of conducting it, this essay takes up the analysis of the writings and methods of two globally acknowledged authorities on War, Sun Tzu, the Chinese military general and thinker who lived in 500 BC and Machiavelli, the Italian historian, politician and thinker, who achieved great eminence in the early 16th century (Oliver, 2008). Apart from the analysis of the writings of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the study has also involved the examination of the practices of 18th-century military genius Napoleon Bonaparte, the writings of well-known military expert, Clausewitz, and a review of existing strategies and approaches to War, with particular regard to the military principles of the US army; acknowledged to be the most powerful and well developed of modern military forces.

Discussion and Analysis

The literature and theory on warfare and the elaboration of methods on winning wars has evolved over time, enriched by the writings of several military experts and the techniques of enormously successful military leaders.

Evolution of Thinking on Warfare

Sun Tzu (544 BC -493 BC)

Sun Tzu authored a classic text on military strategy, The Art of War, 2500 years ago (McNeilly, 2001). He stated that the art of War was governed by five constant factors, i.e. (1) Moral Law, (2) Heaven, (3) Earth, (4) the Commander and (5) method and Discipline, all of which needed to be taken into account in the formulation of the military plan (McNeilly, 2001). Whilst Sun Tzu did not provide direct advice on winning wars, the five factors espoused by him can be easily used in situations of conflict (McNeilly, 2001).

Moral Law for example, calls for people to be in accordance with their rulers and follow them without regard for their lives (Lionel, 2000). It brings out issues of trust and loyalty in the conduct of warfare (Lionel, 2000). Heaven, the second factor, stands for the seasons, cold and heat and night and day (Lionel, 2000). It makes a point of paired contrasts stating that advisors and students must work together to promote growth and development (Lionel, 2000). Earth, the third factor, is composed of large and small distances, narrow spaces, open ground and chances of life and death (Sawyer, 2007). Decisions on wars should be taken after knowing about the positive and negative outcomes of choices as well as the opportunities that are available and their impact upon the outcomes of law (Sawyer, 2007).

The fourth factor, the Commander, embodies wisdom, benevolence and sincerity and courage and strictness (Sawyer, 2007). It is essential for warfare to be conducted with the help of organisations with such commanders who can provide appropriate advice about the conduct of War (Sawyer, 2007). The key elements of the final factor, namely Method and Discipline, should be viewed together and entail the use of the army and the controlling of its costs (Sawyer, 2005). Armies should be used carefully in order to maximise their utility and efforts should be made to ensure optimum utilisation of military resources (Sawyer, 2007). Sun Tzu has provided diverse other information on the conduct of War and his writings reveal striking similarities between the fundamentals of War then and now (Sawyer, 2005). He stated, as under.

“To win without fighting; and if fighting one must, avoid strength and attack weaknesses; everything else is subordinate and a means to effectively achieve these canons. To do so, it will be shown that War, the use of violence to impose one’s will, remains a means to achieve political objectives, which necessitates an holistic offensive approach and the selection of the most effective modes of warfare if it is to be victoriously terminated at the lowest possible cost and in the shortest possible time”. (Oliver, 2008, p 1)

Machiavelli (1469-1527)

Machiavelli, the globally acclaimed Italian Politian and strategist, authored The Art of War in 1520 (Niccolo, 2010). His treatise has many themes and was based upon the detailed study and analysis of historical and modern military practices, as well as his personal observations on the size, weaponry, composition, motivation and logistical abilities of the most well known contemporary army’s (Niccolo, 2010).

Machiavelli stated that War needed to be expressly defined (Niccolo, 2010). Developing the philosophy of limited warfare, he stated that War became an extension of politics when diplomacy failed (Niccolo, 2010). Writing at a time when the use of firearms was still in its infancy and stage of initial development, Machiavelli’s strategies focused more upon the use of infantry, armed with swords and shields (Oppenheimer, 2011). His work expressed admiration and emulation of Roman military practices, which were adopted, slowly and carefully by several European rulers and commanders in the 15th and 16th centuries (Oppenheimer, 2011). His book laid the foundation for the method of linear tactics, which were used by various commanders, especially Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden (Oppenheimer, 2011). The concept of linear tactics dominated European warfare until the Napoleonic wars (Oppenheimer, 2011).

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), a French military and political leader, was globally acclaimed for his military genius and his brilliant military victories in Europe (Connelly, 2006). Napoleon was the first to apply the policy of universal conscription, which led to substantial enhancement in the number of soldiers and the size of the French army and provided substance and weight to French policy and military strategy (John, 2004). He reorganised the unitary French army into permanent divisions and corps, combining cavalry, artillery, infantry and support services (John, 2004). Such restructuring of the forces provided commanders with flexibility and balance and multiplied major operational choices (Connelly, 2006). A gunner officer by training, Napoleon modernised and organised the French artillery, providing France with the most mobile and efficient artillery in the world (Connelly, 2006). With artillery closely supporting infantry, the striking power of the French army increased enormously on account of this innovation (Connelly, 2006).

Napoleon expanded the military staff, enhancing and improving control over dispersed military forces (John, 2004). He furthermore augmented the commissioning of officers, which was previously a privilege of the aristocracy, and thereby opened the window for new talent (John, 2004). His strategic plans constantly focused upon overwhelming tactical decisions and the construction of decisive battles that would eliminate the opposing army (Hazareesingh, 2005). He introduced several manoeuvring tactics, both from the centre and from the sides that would envelop enemy positions and threaten communication lines (Hazareesingh, 2005). His principles of War were focused upon the concentration of forces, speed of movement, boldness of operation, initiative in attack, centralisation of command and the use of psychology and morale, both to motivate his own army and to defeat the others (Hazareesingh, 2005).

Clausewitz (1780-1831)

Clausewitz, a contemporary of Napoleon, authored the study The Principles of War in 1812 and subsequently enlarged his thinking in his book On War some years later (Paret, 1976). Clausewitz’s writing has been widely acknowledged for its perception and relevance and continues to influence military thinking even today (Paret, 1976). Clausewitz provided significant details on issues like (a) general principles of War, (b) the theory of combat, or tactics, (c) general principles for offence, (d) principles for governing the use of troops, (e) principles for the use of terrain, strategy and (f) the application of principles in practice at the time of War (Paret, 1976).

Clausewitz stated that warfare had three primary objectives, namely to conquer or destroy the armed power of the enemy, to take possession of his materials and other sources of strength and gain public opinion (Beatrice, 2010). Warfare, he declared, should be directed against the main body of the enemy army because its defeat was essential for gaining material possessions and public opinion (Beatrice, 2010). Clausewitz formulated several rules for the achievement of these objectives (Beatrice, 2010). He stated that the entire forces needed to be used with the utmost energy because any moderation in this area would result in underachievement of objectives (Rogers, 2002). Clausewitz declared that it was extremely important to concentrate military power against the section where chief blows had to be delivered, even if it opened up the possibilities of disadvantages elsewhere (Rogers, 2002). He stated that time was of great essence if important advantages were to be gained and hesitation inaction should be resorted to only after due thought to the process (Rogers, 2002).

Clausewitz furthermore stated that successes should be followed with the greatest of energy because only the pursuit of a beaten enemy provided the fruits of victory (Rogers, 2002). Clausewitz wrote at length upon the rules to be followed for defensive and offensive warfare, stating that whilst small nations with limited resources should not engage in offensive warfare, which could turn out to be extremely foolhardy, they would be able to engage in defensive wars with great effectiveness (Christopher, 1994). The pursuit of defensive wars by small states could possibly provide them with opportunities to score these decisive military victories and enhance their global positions and their domestic societies (Christopher, 1994).

Contemporary Approaches to Warfare

The preceding section has focused on information about the principles of warfare that were adopted in historical times and the ways in which changes were brought in with the progression of technology and military thought. The introduction of gun powder and firearms in the 14th century led to significant changes in the use of men and material as well as in planning, strategy and tactics (Sawyer, 2005). Napoleon contributed enormously to the modernisation of warfare and the structuring and deployment of army’s and resources (Connelly, 2006).

Contemporary years have, however, witnessed astonishing developments in military technology that have radically changed the ways of conducting warfare (Handel, 2001), (Sawyer, 2005). This section attempts to provide some details on the changes that have occurred in thinking on warfare and the deployment of men, machines and weaponry in modern times.

Systems versus Classical Approach

Numerous technological advancements over the course of the 20th century and especially in the last three decades have resulted in significant changes in approaches and attitudes towards military action on warfare, especially amongst the USA and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Vego, 2009). Modern armies are combining important elements of the Clausewitzian and Napoleonic views of warfare with the systemic approach to conflict (Vego, 2009). John Warden of the US Air Force depicted the enemy as a system made up of numerous subsystems and stated that these systems were organised similarly, needed information for functioning, their change-resistant and did not react immediately to external forces (Vego, 2009). All systems are comprised of five rings, commencing with leadership at the centre and moving outward to processes, physical infrastructure, population and elements. Systems’ thinking is being used by contemporary military experts to examine linkages between systems, evaluate system elements and engage in strategic planning (Vego, 2009). There is, however, agreement amongst experts that whilst technological advancements have radically altered the conduct of War, it remains subject to uncertainties, friction, luck, chance, danger, illogicality and irrationality (Vego, 2009).

Modern US Approach to War

Dramatic enhancements in communications, weaponry, sensors and even the use of individual soldiers have, as elaborated earlier, radically altered the conduct of military activity and warfare (POGO, 2010). The US army, which, for all practical purposes, is the most powerful of contemporary military forces with powers to strike far outside the American homeland, is bringing in several changes in order to establish a significant competitive edge over its existing and potential adversaries (POGO, 2010).

The development of a global information grid is going to help the US army in the collection, analysis and distribution of information. Systems are being developed to enable commanders on one platform to execute offensive or defensive action electronically with the help of sensor data from a second platform and weapons from another (POGO, 2010). The battlespace, which has now become net-centric, will facilitate seamless communication and information sharing between services and swift fulfilment of requests (POGO, 2010). The US military forces have thus defined some specific principles of warfare that are being progressively implemented for use in future conflicts (Van Avery, 2007). These are elaborated in the following paragraphs.

It is important to formulate a clear and achievable objective subsequent to the assessment of threats. The objectives thus focus all efforts towards the attainment of an achievable end position. This principle of War has emerged and altered over time. The clear definition of an achievable objective is thus critical for military success (Van Avery, 2007). Speed is critical for all actions related to War. The successful seizing of initiatives and repeated striking at enemies before they have chances of reorientation has proven to be successful time and again. Speed enables an army to seize the initiative, strike in a critical manner and decide on the fly (Van Avery, 2007).

The concentration of effect, which will replace mass, will lead to focusing of firepower, electronic attack and information operations for defeating the enemy. With battle lines difficult to identify, it shall be important to combat forces and technology and think in terms of effects, rather than force (Van Avery, 2007). It will be important to employ the appropriate combination and number of effects to destroy or neutralise enemies and achieve objectives. Planners will have to sequence the impact of systems, platforms and weapons in a synergistic manner to produce desired results with minimisation of casualties and destruction (Van Avery, 2007).

It shall be important to build exploitable and in-depth knowledge of the battlespace and vulnerability of opponents. Information will be increasingly critical for the effective planning and execution of combat operations. Armies will have to engage in continuous planning and the ongoing formulation and reformulation of action plans for existing situations as well as contingencies in order to achieve objectives. It will be necessary to debunk the Napoleonic idea of the simplest plan being the best possible plan (Van Avery, 2007).

Armies will have to constantly work at enhancing flexibility in adapting to new or diverse situations or requirements. Such probability will allow armies to achieve economy and concentration of effects (Van Avery, 2007). It will be necessary to ensure sustenance and persistence in the availability of forces to continue the conflict from entry to withdrawal. With forces dependent upon logistics and supplies, it will be critically important to sustain supplies (Van Avery, 2007).

It shall be necessary to achieve unity of command and in ensuring that the force does not have more command layers and divisions than necessary. Both political leaders and commanders must work towards the generation of unity of command and resist the temptation of allowing more players to come into the field (Van Avery, 2007).

It shall be necessary to integrate actors, allowing for the suitable participation of all forces and agencies in war-related activity. With unilateral military action by a country becoming less likely, it shall be important to plan for international cooperation and the persuasion of other actors to participate in the effort (Van Avery, 2007).

The armed forces must finally focus upon acting unpredictably in order to leverage the use of effects. Whilst strategic surprise will continue to be difficult in the information age, flexibility and creativity in military command can result in opportunities to strike in manners that cannot be predicted by opponents (Van Avery, 2007).

Conclusions and Recommendations

This essay focused on the study of traditional and contemporary military practices in order to determine the best way to win a war. The investigation carried out for this purpose revealed that thinking by military experts and national leaders on the conduct of War has evolved considerably over the centuries and especially so in the last few decades (Sawyer, 2005). Much of warfare till the 14th century used to be carried out by forces without the use of gun powder and firearms, making use of factors like numbers, surprise and terrain to achieve victory (Sawyer, 2005). It is important however to keep in mind that military thinkers have constantly focused upon the importance of formulating the objectives of War in a comprehensive manner and in achieving them completely in order to establish victory (Sawyer, 2005).

Whilst the formulation of a military objective continues to be paramount, significant changes have been brought into the strategising and practice of warfare by Napoleon, who introduced conscription, the formation of specialised divisions, the use of composite and multidisciplinary armies and extensive variations in manoeuvring to build up battles and eliminate enemies (Handel, 2001). It is evident from the practices adopted by Napoleon and the writing of Clausewitz that success in War was initiated by the formulation of objectives, followed by the use of unitary command, strong military forces, multidisciplinary armies with extensive capabilities, manoeuvring, speed and flexibility (Vego, 2009).

Recent decades have witnessed huge changes in the conduct of warfare with America, the most powerful army in the world having to battle with several types of adversaries, ranging from small and focused terrorists to well equipped armies (Van Avery, 2007). Advances in technology have helped the US army tremendously in adding to its capability, flexibility, speed and capacity for surprise (POGO, 2010).

It is however evident that whilst technological advances have rendered much of traditional approaches to fighting obsolete, the success of modern wars continues to depend to a great extent on clarity in formulation of war objectives, unitary command, strong and extensive fighting resources, sustainability of supplies, speed, flexibility, surprise and unpredictability (Vego, 2009). These elements of successful warfare continue to be as relevant today, in the age of sensor guided electronic warfare, as they were in the time of Alexander (Vego, 2009).

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